|Statement||Olivier Jean Blanchard.|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- working paper no. 3664, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 3664|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||20 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||20|
Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence Olivier Jean Blanchard. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in March NBER Program(s):Economic Fluctuations and Growth This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. Downloadable! This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either the search behavior or. Downloadable (with restrictions)! This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either. Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility, and Persistence Article in The B E Journal of Macroeconomics 13(1) February with 16 Reads How we measure 'reads'.
A close relationship among unemployment persistence, duration dependence and longterm unemployment has established itself in the literature (e.g. Alogoskoufis and . He also raises issues of hiring and firing, the market power of incumbent workers, the design of unemployment benefit systems, the organization of wage bargaining, labor market training, and exchange systems, and public sector employment Lindbeck is Professor and Director of the Institute for International Economic Studies at the. This book provides an answer to this question, by highlighting the the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or - Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment Isabela Mares Frontmatter More information. List of Abbreviations DGB Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Federation of . Wages Set by Insiders. Economic Agents at the Table. The economic agents at play are the employed, the unemployed, firms, often unions (referred to by collective bargaining), and sometimes the government.. The insider-outsider model explains why nations with high collective bargaining experience the most severe persistence in the natural rate of unemployment.
Finally, Drazen () considers how unemployment persistence can occur through the attrition of human capital in a recession. /87/$ [O , Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) E.E.R F A. Lindbeck and D.J. Snower, Union activity, unemployment and wages in which unions (or, simply, workers with market power) may Cited by: Taxation, Wage Bargaining, and Unemployment the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such This book develops a theoretical framework that provides an. wage bargaining and, 20 wage bargaining centralization and, 22, 45–6. Union of Commercial Employees (HAO), unions. See by country (i.e., German unions, British unions, etc.) double sacrifice of, –26 monetary policy regimes, interaction of and, 30–2 in Soskice-Iversen and Iversen models, Balancing theoretical insights with lessons drawn from the experience of many countries, Lindbeck examines employment and unemployment against the background of developed market economies during the past century. Assar Lindbeck demonstrates how macroeconomic analysis can incorporate a labor market characterized by unemployment. Balancing theoretical insights with lessons drawn from .